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BEING ABLE TO PROSECUTE SAIF AL-ISLAM GADDAFI:
APPLYING ARTICLE 17(3) OF THE ROME STATUTE TO
LIBYA
INTRODUCTION
The Arab Spring was a series of revolutions and demonstrations occurring
in several nations throughout the Middle East and North Africa.1 One such
revolution was the Libyan Civil War, which ended the forty-year reign of
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.2 While the revolution certainly affected the lives
of Libyans, it also left its mark on international criminal law. On February 26,
2011, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1970, which
referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court’s Office of
the Prosecutor (OTP) for an investigation into any international crimes
committed by Muammar Gaddafi and his regime since February 15, 2011.3 As
a result, the Pre-Trial Chamber (Chamber)4 of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) issued warrants for the arrest of Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam
Gaddafi (Gaddafi),5 and Abdullah al-Senussi,6 alleging their responsibility for
committing crimes against humanity during the conflict.7 The charges against

1

See generally Fouad Ajami, The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar./Apr. 2012, at 56, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137053/fouad-ajami/the-arabspring-at-one?page=show.
2 See id. at 59.
3 S.C. Res. 1970, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
4 The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC is the division responsible for overseeing a case or situation until
the accused has been charged and the Prosecutor is ready to proceed to trial. Pre-Trial Division, INT’L CRIM.
CT., http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/pre%20trial%20division/
Pages/pre%20trial%20division.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). Among its other various functions, the
Chamber may authorize the Prosecutor to investigate a situation on her own motion, issues warrants for arrest,
and otherwise ensure the integrity of the investigative proceedings. Id.
5 Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is one of the sons of Muammar Gaddafi and was the honorary chairman of the
Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation and acting Prime Minister of Libya under his
father’s government. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11,
CT. http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/
Case
Information
Sheet,
INT’L CRIM.
SaifAlIslamSenussiEng.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Case Information Sheet].
6 Abdullah al-Senussi was a colonel in the Libyan Armed Forces and the head of Military Intelligence
under Muammar Gaddafi. Id.
7 See Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11, Decision on the “Prosecutor’s
Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi
and Abdullah Al-Senussi,” para. 41 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101337.pdf
[hereinafter Prosecutor’s Warrant Application]; Case Information Sheet, supra note 5.
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Muammar Gaddafi were dropped due to his death,8 but the case against Saif
Gaddafi and al-Senussi has continued and become an important issue for the
new Libyan government, which has challenged the admissibility of the Gaddafi
case before the ICC.9 The Chamber denied Libya’s admissibility challenge on
May 31, 2013.10
What is perhaps most exceptional about this case is the admissibility
exception that the parties originally talked about the least: inability. A case is
inadmissible in the ICC if “[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable to
genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution.”11 A state is considered
unable to investigate or prosecute a defendant when, “due to a total or
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”12 Libya, in its original
challenge, addressed the issues of whether it is investigating the same crime
before the ICC13 and whether it is willing to carry out the prosecution.14
However, Libya barely spoke to the issue of whether it is “unable to
genuinely” investigate or prosecute Gaddafi outside of mere policy
arguments.15 The OTP also barely touched on the issue of inability in its
response to Libya’s motion, dedicating only about two paragraphs of its
motion to whether Libya is able to investigate and prosecute the case.16 Indeed,
even the Office of Public Counsel for the Defense (OPCD) talked

8

Case Information Sheet, supra note 5.
Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Application on
Behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, para. 1 (May 1, 2012), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1405819.pdf [hereinafter Libya’s Admissibility Motion].
10 Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on
the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, para. 219 (May 31, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf [hereinafter Admissibility Decision].
11 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, para. 1(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
12 Id. art. 17(3).
13 See Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, paras. 39–52.
14 See id. paras. 53–67.
15 See generally id. paras. 96–102.
16 See Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11,
Prosecution Response to Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC
Statute, paras. 8, 41 (June 5, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1423546.pdf [hereinafter
Prosecutor’s Admissibility Response].
9
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comparatively little about Libya’s ability to investigate and prosecute when
compared to other sections of its brief.17
That the parties spent so little time discussing the inability exception is
unfortunate, because it eventually became one of the issues the Chamber talked
about the most in its decision on the admissibility challenge.18 Regrettably, the
Chamber decided that Libya was genuinely unable to investigate or prosecute
Gaddafi in obiter dictum.19 The situation in Libya offered the ICC a unique
opportunity to address the issue of inability, because the decision the Court
made in this case may not only affect how it views the ability of a state to
prosecute a suspect in the future, but it may also affect the ICC’s policy toward
the principle of complementarity20 and, ultimately, the ICC’s relationship with
state-parties and states recovering from internal conflict for years to come.21
By declaring that Libya was genuinely unable to investigate or prosecute
Gaddafi, the ICC missed an opportunity to implement a policy of positive
complementarity to address the possible inability of a state to prosecute a
defendant. Such a policy would help build a transitional government’s justice
system rather than deprive that country of the ability to prosecute a former
regime for wrongdoing against its people.22
This Comment argues that the Chamber wrongly decided the issue of
Libya’s ability to investigate and prosecute Gaddafi because it should have
never reached the question. Even if it had, the Chamber’s analysis under
Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute was inherently flawed. Rather, out of respect
for state sovereignty and the strict circumstances under which the drafters of
the Rome Statute wished to place the inability exception to Articles 17(1)(a)
and (b), the Chamber should have found Gaddafi’s case inadmissible. Part I
will address the background of the situation in Libya and the case against
Gaddafi, the arguments offered by Libya in support of its admissibility
challenge, and the OTP’s and the OPCD’s responses. Part II will discuss the
Chamber’s decision on Libya’s admissibility challenge. Part III will discuss the
17 See Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Defense
Response to the Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute,
(July 31, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1446165.pdf [hereinafter Defense’s Admissibility
Response]. Compare the OPCD’s discussion of Libya’s investigation in paragraphs 67–154 and its discussion
of unwillingness in paragraphs 155–353 with their discussion on inability in paragraphs 354–408. Id.
18 See Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, paras. 199–215.
19 Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, para. 215.
20 See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
21 See Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, para. 101.
22 See id. para. 102.
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history of Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute, explore why the inability
provision was added, and analyze how Article 17 is currently construed. Part
IV will discuss Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’s case before the ICC, a case in
which the issue of inability has also arisen, and compare it to the situation in
Libya. Part V will discuss the case against Gaddafi in light of complementarity
and the Bemba case and give reasons why the ICC should find that Gaddafi’s
case is, at this time, inadmissible.
I. BACKGROUND
To understand the context and substance of the case against Gaddafi, as
well as why Libya is at this time genuinely able to investigate and prosecute
the case, it is important to know the history of the case, the arguments of the
parties in their motions and at the admissibility hearing, and developments in
Libya since the admissibility challenge has been submitted. This Comment will
discuss each in turn.
A. History of the Case Against Gaddafi
Before the National Transitional Council of Libya (NTC or Libya) gained
control of Libya, the country was ruled by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi
following his coup d’état in 1969.23 Muammar Gaddafi’s control over Libya
began to slip after protests arose in Libya, despite a regime crackdown, in what
was called a “day of rage” on February 17, 2011.24
Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Gaddafi, and al-Senussi met to “plan the
repression of the protest” by mobilizing Libyan Security Forces, recruiting
mercenaries, and releasing prisoners convicted of minor crimes so that they
could participate in pro-Gaddafi protests and otherwise create chaos.25 Saif
Gaddafi in particular “took an active role in the recruitment of foreign
mercenaries.”26 The protests quickly escalated into conflicts between the

23 Gregory Viscusi, Qaddafi Is No Mubarak as Regime Overthrow May Trigger a ‘Descent to Chaos’,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-23/qaddafi-is-no-mubarakoverthrow-may-mean-descent-to-chaos-.html.
24 See Deadly ‘Day of Rage’ in Libya, AL-JAZEERA (Feb. 18, 2011, 5:34 AM), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/africa/2011/02/201121716917273192.html.
25 Prosecutor’s Warrant Application, supra note 7, para. 9.
26 Id. para. 10.
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demonstrators and Muammar Gaddafi’s regime.27 The killing of protesters was
allegedly expressly authorized by Muammar Gaddafi and coordinated by alSenussi as a means of suppressing the protests.28 Not surprisingly, larger
demonstrations against Muammar Gaddafi’s regime resulted from the killings
of these protesters, bringing about “a systematic and even more violent
response” from the Security Forces.29 On February 20, 2011, Saif Gaddafi
threatened a civil war that would be “worse than Iraq and worse than in
Yugoslavia that would cause thousands of deaths” if the protests did not stop.30
Once the protests escalated into civil war, the NTC was created in
Benghazi on February 27, 2011 to serve as the “political face . . . for the
revolution” against Muammar Gaddafi and his regime.31 During a speech
renouncing the Gaddafi regime, Libya’s deputy ambassador to the United
Nations, Ibrahim Dabbashi, issued perhaps the first call from the Libyan
Mission to the United Nations to have the ICC investigate Muammar Gaddafi
for war crimes and crimes against humanity.32 On February 26, 2011, the
Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1970 which, among other
things, referred the situation in Libya to the OTP for an investigation of any
international crimes since February 15, 2011.33
27 Deadly ‘Day of Rage’ in Libya, supra note 24. In Benghazi, for instance, an eyewitness reported that
police killed six unarmed protesters and the police further released thirty people from jail, paying and arming
them so that they could fight the protesters. Id.
28 Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, supra note 7, para. 12.
29 See id. paras. 13–17 (noting that demonstrations continued to take place in Tripoli and that the
protesters were fired upon by the Security Forces). Subsequently, the protesters began to set fire to government
buildings. Id.
30 Id. para. 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31 Libya: Timeline of the Conflict, EURONEWS (Aug. 29, 2011, 3:14 PM), http://www.euronews.com/
2011/08/29/libya-timeline-of-the-conflict/. Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Jalil, a former member of Muammar
Gaddafi’s cabinet, became the head of the NTC after its formation. Libya Opposition Launches Council, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 27, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011227175955221853.
html.
32 Houda Mzioudet, First Diplomat To Denounce Qaddafi Returns to NY as UN Ambassador, LIBYA
HERALD (June 17, 2013), http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/06/17/first-diplomat-to-denounce-qaddafi-returnsto-ny-as-un-ambassador/.
33 S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 3, para. 4. This was the second time that the Security Council has made
such a referral, and the first time that such a referral was made unanimously. Edward Wyatt, Security Council
Refers Libya to Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, at 14; India Backs UN Sanctions Against Libya,
IBN LIVE (Feb. 27, 2011, 11:18 AM), http://ibnlive.in.com/news/india-backs-un-sanctions-against-libya/
144537-3.html. The first Security Council referral to the ICC occurred in 2005 with the adoption of Resolution
1593 which referred the situation in Darfur to the OTP. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351
(Mar. 31, 2005) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm. The vote, however,
was not unanimous, with only eleven countries voting in favor of the resolution, none voting against the
resolution, and Algeria, Brazil, China, and the United States abstaining. Id.
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In a decision rendered on June 27, 2011, the Chamber issued warrants for
the arrest of Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Gaddafi and al-Senussi for their alleged
responsibility in committing murder as a crime against humanity under Article
7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute and persecution as a crime against humanity under
Article 7(1)(h).34 Saif Gaddafi was indicted as an indirect co-perpetrator of
these crimes, and al-Senussi was indicted as an indirect perpetrator.35
However, gaining custody over the Gaddafis and al-Senussi has proven
difficult for the ICC.36 Muammar Gaddafi died from wounds sustained during
the Battle of Sirte.37 Because of his death, the Chamber formally dropped the
charges against Muammar Gaddafi.38
On November 19, 2011, militia forces in Zintan, Libya captured Saif
Gaddafi.39 Immediately after his arrest, Libya resisted turning him over to the
ICC and began to investigate him for financial and corruption crimes.40 The
Libyan Prosecutor-General did not begin investigating Gaddafi for serious
crimes such as murder and rape until January 2012.41 The Zintan militia has
held Gaddafi in Zintan since his capture.42

34 Prosecutor’s Warrant Application, supra note 7, paras. 95, 99, 102. According to Article 7(1)(h), a
crime against humanity exists when there is “[p]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . or other grounds that are universally recognized
as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court.” Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 7. Persecution is defined in Article
7(2)(g) as “the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason
of the identity of the group or collectivity.” Id.
35 Case Information Sheet, supra note 5.
36 On the day the warrants were issued, Muammar Gaddafi’s regime was still in control of Tripoli, even
though rebel forces were making a push for the capital. Libya: Fierce Fighting South-West of Tripoli, BBC
NEWS (June 27, 2011, 5:54 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13921665.
37 Rania El Gamal & Tim Gaynor, Gaddafi Killed as Libya’s Revolt Claims Hometown, REUTERS (Oct.
20, 2011), http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE79J09O20111020.
38 Case Information Sheet, supra note 5.
39 Marie-Louise Gumuchian, Gaddafi’s Son Captured, Scared and Without a Fight, REUTERS (Nov. 19,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/19/us-libya-idUSTRE7AI0G820111119.
40 Id.; Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, para. 23. Several non-governmental organizations,
including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, were calling on the NTC to turn Gaddafi over to
the ICC. Gumuchian, supra note 39.
41 Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, para. 25. Libya initially stated that the investigation of
Gaddafi for more serious crimes began January 8, 2012. Id. Confusingly, in a response filed on January 23,
2012 to the ICC, the NTC stated that it was still “considering whether to also institute national proceedings ‘in
relation to the same conduct for which [Gaddafi] is sought by the [ICC].’” Id. para. 26.
42 Libya Challenges International Criminal Court’s Order to Hand Over Saif Gadhafi, CNN (Oct. 9,
2012, 7:55AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/09/world/africa/netherlands-saif-gadhafi-appeal/index.html.
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Al-Senussi was not captured until March 17, 2012, at the Nouakchott
airport in Mauritania.43 Eventually al-Senussi was extradited to Libya on
September 5, 2012,44 and there were reports that Libya paid as much as $200
million to Mauritania to secure his transfer.45 The NTC began investigating alSenussi for his participation in the atrocities during the Libyan Civil War
almost immediately after his capture.46
On January 23, 2012, the NTC began to fight Gaddafi’s surrender,
requesting a postponement of the surrender request under Article 94(1) of the
Rome Statute so that Libya could finish investigating and prosecuting Gaddafi
for various national crimes.47 On March 7, 2012, the Chamber denied the
postponement request and stated that “Libya must grant the surrender
request.”48 On March 22, 2012, Libya again tried to postpone Gaddafi’s
surrender to the ICC by expressing their intent to challenge the admissibility of
Gaddafi’s case and seeking suspension of the surrender under Article 95 of the
Statute.49 This request was also denied because there was no actual
admissibility challenge being considered by the Chamber.50
B. The Parties’ Arguments
On May 1, 2012, the NTC challenged the admissibility of the case against
Gaddafi in the ICC.51 The OTP followed with its response, filed on June 5,
2012,52 and the OPCD filed its response on July 31, 2012.53 The Chamber held
43 Gaddafi Spy Chief Abdullah al-Senussi Held in Mauritania, BBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2012, 4:16 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17413626.
44 Mauritania Deports Libya Spy Chief Abdullah al-Senussi, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2012 1:45 PM), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19487228. Al-Senussi was not immediately deported to Libya because
there was a dispute between France and Libya about who should gain custody of him. Gaddafi Spy Chief
Abdullah al-Senussi Held in Mauritania, supra note 43. French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for alSenussi to be extradited to France because he was convicted by a French court of being involved in an attack
on a French plane in 1989 that killed 170 people. Id.
45 George Grant, Government Struck Financial Deal with Mauritania over Senussi Handover, LIBYA
HERALD (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/09/05/govt-struck-financial-deal-with-mauritaniaover-senussi-handover/.
46 Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, paras. 23, 25.
47 Id. para. 26. Article 94(1) allows for the postponement of a request if such “immediate execution of a
request would interfere with an ongoing investigation or prosecution of a case different from that to which the
request relates.” Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 94, para. 1.
48 Id. para. 29.
49 Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, para. 31. Article 95 allows for the postponement of a
request when a case’s admissibility is challenged. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 95.
50 Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, para. 32.
51 Id. para. 6.
52 See generally Prosecutor’s Admissibility Response, supra note 16.
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a hearing on the admissibility challenge on October 9 and 10, 2012.54 This Part
will discuss the arguments made by each party in their court filings and will
then discuss the new assertions brought by the parties during the admissibility
hearing and the parties’ submissions after the hearing.
1. Libya’s Admissibility Challenge
As mentioned above, the parties barely touched on the issue of whether
Libya is able to investigate and prosecute Gaddafi in their original
submissions.55 Libya did state that the inability exception will determine
whether complementarity will become “a realistic and reasonable system, or a
utopian concept with no practical application;” that “the purpose of transitional
justice is to provide an opportunity for post-conflict judicial capacity
building;”56 and that it could “become a tool for overly harsh assessments of
the judicial machinery in developing countries.”57 Referring to the Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo case, which was also before the ICC, Libya further asserted
that even if a state is presently unable to prosecute a defendant, an unable state
can quickly become able to prosecute a defendant.58 Outside of policy
arguments, Libya merely mentioned that it had custody of Gaddafi, that the
evidence of Gaddafi’s crimes existed in Libya, and that Libya had requested alSenussi’s extradition from Mauritania.59 Libya further claimed that it would be
able to carry out the necessary proceedings to prosecute Gaddafi because it had
requested help from the “UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other
organizations with respect to strengthening the capacity of the judiciary and the
legal profession in general and to provide specialized training for judges and
prosecutors, with a particular focus on litigation related to transitional
justice.”60 Still, the heart of Libya’s argument for its admissibility motion was
that the Court denying Libya the chance to prosecute Gaddafi “would be
53

See generally id.
Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Hearing on the
Admissibility Challenge (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1481845.pdf [hereinafter
Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript]; Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11, Hearing on the Admissibility Challenge (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1487823.pdf [hereinafter Admissibility Hearing Day 2 Transcript].
55 See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text.
56 Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, para. 98.
57 Id. para. 99 (quoting Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17: Issues of Admissibility, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 605, 624 (Otto Triffterer ed.,
2d. ed. 2008)).
58 Id. para. 100.
59 Id. para. 96.
60 Id. para. 97.
54
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manifestly at variance with the principle of complementarity,” despite
indications that Libya was able to carry out a prosecution with international
assistance.61
Outside of its explicit arguments, Libya offered other facts that serve as
indicia that Libya is genuinely able to investigate and prosecute Gaddafi. For
instance, Libya mentioned that it has a Code of Criminal Procedure that directs
investigatory processes, trials, and appeals, and that such investigations be
done confidentially.62 Libya also claimed that it followed that code while
extending Gaddafi’s detention in Zintan.63 The Prosecutor-General, who is
overseeing the investigation of Gaddafi, began the process of investigating
Gaddafi for war crimes committed during the Libyan Civil War by intercepting
calls and conducting interviews with witnesses.64
Further, the Libyan Constitutional Declaration of 2011 made a provision
for an independent judiciary and prohibited any “exceptional courts” that were
used during the Colonel Gaddafi regime to effect human rights violations.65
The judiciary has already expressed this independence by overturning a law
enacted by the NTC that “penalizes anyone who praises Muammar Gaddafi or
his sons, or refers to them as ‘reformers,’ or states anything against the
interests of the state or the February revolution.”66 The 2011 Libyan
Constitution further guarantees fairness by providing access to a defense
attorney, even if it has to be appointed by the court free of cost.67 The
defendant is also guaranteed a right to present evidence in his defense, to
request a written judgment, and to various forms of appeal.68 Finally, Libya has
a Criminal Code that would allow it to charge Gaddafi, if the evidence is
sufficient, for crimes such as intentional murder, torture, arresting people
without just cause.69

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. para. 98.
Id. paras. 39–40.
Id. paras. 42–43.
Id. paras. 44–47.
Id. paras. 53–54 (citation omitted).
Defense’s Admissibility Response, supra note 17, para. 316.
Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, para. 59, 62.
Id. paras. 63, 65.
Id. para. 75.
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2. The OTP’s Response
The OTP also barely touched upon the issue of inability in its response to
Libya’s motion.70 To the extent that the OTP did raise the issue of Libya’s
ability to prosecute Gaddafi, it simply observed that the militia in Zintan that
captured and held Gaddafi may not be part of the NTC.71 This fact raises a
concern that the NTC does not actually have, and may not be able to gain,
custody over Gaddafi, a requirement under Article 17(3).72 The OTP also
pointed out that a defense counsel has yet to be appointed for Gaddafi in Libya,
perhaps due in part to his captors in Zintan.73 In raising this concern, the OTP
did not argue that Libya’s criminal justice system must conform to
international due process standards74 but instead argued that the fact that Libya
had not appointed an attorney might be evidence that it is unable to prosecute
Gaddafi.75 Thus, even though the OTP believed that Libya was investigating
Gaddafi for the same crimes as the ICC,76 it submitted that the NTC should
provide further evidence to the ICC that they are able to actually prosecute
Gaddafi.77
3. The OPCD’s Response
The OPCD, in contrast, provided a thorough argument against Libya’s
admissibility challenge. First, it argued that the NTC did not have effective
custody over Gaddafi because he was held by the Zintan militia, which,
according to the OPCD, was an entity completely distinct from the NTC.78
Second, the OPCD argued that the NTC lacked the authorities and judges to

70

See Prosecutor’s Admissibility Response, supra note 16, paras. 8, 41.
Id. para. 8.
72 Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17, para. 3.
73 Prosecutor’s Admissibility Response, supra note 16, para. 41.
74 Id. para. 28.
75 Id. para. 41.
76 Id. para. 46.
77 Id. paras. 8, 41.
78 Defense’s Admissibility Response, supra note 17, paras. 358–68. In relation to Gaddafi’s custody in
Zintan, the OCPD claimed that in the time that Gaddafi has been held in Zintan, he has been:
71

(1) not brought before a judge; (2) not granted effective access to lawyers; (3) denied the means
to communicate with friends and family for the purpose of selecting lawyers, (4) questioned . . .
without the presence of a lawyer and without any waiver being obtained; and (5) not provided
any written information or evidence concerning the status of domestic proceedings (and requests
for the same by the OPCD on his behalf have been rebuffed).
Id. para. 214.
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effectively investigate and prosecute any case against Gaddafi.79 The OPCD
also argued that the NTC lacked the ability to keep any judges, prosecuting
authorities, defendants, and witnesses safe from harm.80 The OPCD further
argued that if a judge were to give an order in the Gaddafi case, the NTC
would be unable to implement that order.81
With regard to Libya’s lack of judicial and police authorities, the OPCD
submitted that few judges and prosecuting authorities are versed in “basic legal
and human rights standards.”82 Further, some officials have said that the
prosecuting authorities in Libya did not have the ability to properly gather
evidence and that, if Gaddafi were brought to trial in Libya in May, 2012, he
might be found innocent.83 The OPCD also expressed concerns that under
Article 305(1) of the Libyan Criminal Procedure Code, if any evidence,
particularly intercept evidence, against Gaddafi was illegally obtained, such
evidence would have to be excluded, making it possible that not enough
evidence would be admissible to effectively prosecute Gaddafi.84 The OPCD
also pointed out that there were legal impediments to any Gaddafi trial in
Libya if he were to stay in Zintan. For instance, Libyan law does not allow for
in abstentia trials unless the accused is outside of the country, thus making it
necessary to transport Gaddafi to Tripoli for any trial to begin.85 On this point,
the OPCD observed that the Zintan militia has not transferred Gaddafi because
of security concerns in Tripoli.86
Judges also feared for their safety due to the lack of security in cities,
preventing them from returning to work.87 This lack of security also affected
prosecuting authorities from being able to investigate the case unless they
depended upon local militia for security.88 The OPCD further argued that the
79

Id. paras. 369–81.
Id. paras. 382–404.
81 Id. paras. 405–08.
82 Id. para. 370 (quoting U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Libya,
U.N. Human Rights Council, 19th Sess., Mar. 8, 2012, para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (2008)).
83 Defense’s Admissibility Response, supra note 17, paras. 373–74 (citations omitted).
84 Id. para. 217. The intercept evidence to which the OPCD referred concerns phone calls that were
recorded at the order of Muammar Gaddafi by the two major Libyan phone companies. Admissibility Hearing
Day 2 Transcript, supra note 54, at 56–57. After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, these records were
widely available and made their way to the general public. Id. The legal impact of this evidence and how it
became available is discussed below. See infra notes 334–39 and accompanying text.
85 Defense’s Admissibility Response, supra note 17, para. 358.
86 Id. para. 360.
87 Id. para. 384 (citing BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2012: LIBYA 10 (2012)).
88 Id. para. 385.
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arrest and detention of several of its employees by the Zintan militia may
further discourage witnesses from cooperating with a defense attorney in
Libya.89 Finally, there is some speculation as to whether Libya would be able
to effectuate any judicial order if Gaddafi were to be found guilty of any
crimes.90
The OPCD also argued that Libya’s belief regarding its capacity to
investigate and prosecute Gaddafi is irrelevant.91 To support this argument, the
defense pointed to the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.92 In the Bemba case,
the ICC determined the admissibility of a case that was referred to it by the
Central African Republic (CAR).93 The ICC acknowledged that a national
court’s determination of inability was not relevant94 but then made a
determination largely based on the same factors considered by the CAR’s
national court.95 Thus, the OPCD concluded, the Chamber, not Libya,
determines whether Libya can actually investigate and, if necessary, prosecute
Gaddafi.96
4. The Admissibility Hearing
The Chamber convened an admissibility hearing so that the parties could
discuss all of the issues relevant to the admissibility challenge.97 At the
hearing, Libya responded to some of the allegations made by the OPCD. First,
in regards to the security situation in Libya, it stated that the new Libyan
government and army were undertaking a “large scale disarmament drive
targeting militia groups.”98 Second, in response to the accusation that Libya is
taking too long to move the Gaddafi investigation along, Libya pointed out that
even the ICC has required many years to bring accused persons to justice.99

89

Id. para. 393.
Id. paras. 405–06.
91 Defense’s Admissibility Response, supra note 17, para. 355.
92 Id.
93 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-802, Decision on the
Admissibility and Abuse of Process Challenges, para. 15 (June 24, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc899684.pdf [hereinafter Bemba Admissibility Decision]. The Bemba case is discussed more fully below.
See infra Part IV.
94 See Bemba Admissibility Decision, supra note 93, para. 261.
95 See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
96 Defense’s Admissibility Response, supra note 17, para. 355.
97 Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 4.
98 Id. at 10.
99 Id. at 12.
90
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Thus Libya, a country that is coming out of a four-decade dictatorship,100 will
need more time to complete the judicial process.101 Libya also confronted the
allegation that the intercept evidence it recovered may be found inadmissible in
a Libyan court of law.102 On that point, Libya noted that the evidence in
question were the recordings of telephone conversations which were made on
Muammar Gaddafi’s orders.103 Those records were made publicly available
after the downfall of Muammar Gaddafi’s government and, consequently,
would raise unique questions of law for a Libyan court.104 Finally, to show that
its judicial system was working, Libya pointed not only to the fact that the
Libyan Supreme Court overturned a law that “criminalized the glorification of
[Muammar Gaddafi,]” but also to the case of Buzeid Dorda.105 In the Dorda
case, the trial court suspended proceedings until the Libyan Supreme Court
could decide whether the proceedings were unconstitutional because of the use
of procedures that had been used in the People’s Court under the reign of
Muammar Gaddafi.106 Moreover, a declaration by the Libyan Supreme Court
that such procedures were unconstitutional would help combat some of the due
process arguments expressed by the OPCD.107
The OTP continued to support Libya’s admissibility challenge during the
hearing. The OTP’s support of Libya’s admissibility challenge seemed a bit
counterintuitive, a fact that the OTP pointed to during the admissibility
hearing.108 However, the OTP seemed sympathetic to the complexities of
transitional justice and, more importantly, the concern that impunity be
avoided.109 On this latter point, the OTP first supported the assertion by Libya
that it was actively investigating the case against Gaddafi to the same extent as

100

Admissibility Hearing Day 2 Transcript, supra note 54, at 45.
Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 12.
102 Admissibility Hearing Day 2 Transcript, supra note 54, at 56–57.
103 Id. at 56.
104 Id. at 56–57.
105 Id. at 46–47.
106 Libya Court Suspends Trial of Top Gaddafi-Era Intelligence Official, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/11/us-libya-trials-suspension-idUSBRE88A0ZU20120911. People’s
Courts were emergency courts used by Muammar Gaddafi “to try opposition members and political prisoners,
[wherein] one or more people with no legal training could pass judgments without the need for a judge, jury or
lawyers to be present in court.” Id. The People’s Courts were banned after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, but
the law governing them was still in use; thus their application in the Dorda case may have rendered it
unconstitutional. Id.
107 See, e.g., Admissibility Hearing Day 2 Transcript, supra note 54, at 18–19.
108 Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 58–59.
109 Id.
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the OTP.110 The OTP echoed Libya’s concern that Libya needed more time to
recover from its era of tyranny, stating that giving Libya only one week per
year of oppression is not enough time to expect it to be as fully capable as a
functioning state and that the ICC should not “push [itself] to the front and
elbow aside the states that are genuinely able and willing to prosecute their
nationals for their crimes.”111
The OPCD advanced other arguments during the admissibility hearings to
show that Libya is unable to investigate or prosecute Gaddafi. The OPCD
argued that the fairness of legal proceedings can be indicative of a judicial
system that is substantially collapsed or, when systematic, can cause the
substantial collapse of the justice system.112 The OPCD argued that the due
process violations, such as not being brought before a judge, not having legal
representation, and not having the proper “time and facilities” to prepare his
defense have rendered Libya’s judicial system unavailable to former officials
in the Muammar Gaddafi government.113 By extension, the defense argued, the
same violations were likely to occur in Gaddafi’s case.114 It also argued that,
based on testimony from some human rights activists, there is a “systemic
inability within Libya for authorities to understand the proper procedures that
should be applied within a criminal trial and to persons detained under the
protection of the state.”115
The OPCD also attacked the presumption that, even if Libya received
international assistance and monitoring from the ICC, it would comply with
the monitoring.116 To support this argument, it pointed to the fact that since
Gaddafi’s capture, Libya has been under the obligation to extradite Gaddafi to
the ICC and has yet to do so.117 There was also an actual occurrence of
monitoring by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry where Libya asked
for the monitoring to stop on condition that Libya would implement
recommendations by the Commission.118 The OPCD asserted that Libya failed

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 59.
Admissibility Hearing Day 2 Transcript, supra note 54, at 18.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Admissibility Hearing Day 2 Transcript, supra note 54, at 27.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 28.
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to implement these recommendations even after having seven months to do
so.119
Finally, the OPCD also referred to a quote from Dr. Ali Tarhouni, a former
interim Prime Minister for the NTC, who stated that there was a security
breakdown ongoing in Libya to the point that there was “no national
army[,] . . . no internal security agency[,] . . . [and] no police.”120 The lack of
security, especially police forces, would “inevitably impact . . . Libya’s ability
to identify relevant witnesses and physical evidence and to monitor the security
and safety of witnesses.”121 The OPCD bolstered this argument at the
admissibility hearing by referring to recent reports of Muammar Gaddafi’s
former subordinates in Benghazi.122
5. Parties’ Submissions After the Admissibility Hearing
On the Chamber’s order, Libya submitted further information regarding
issues surrounding the admissibility challenge on January 23, 2013.123 First,
Libya noted that on December 23, 2012, the Supreme Court of Libya
unanimously found that the People’s Court procedures used in the Dorda case
were unconstitutional.124 As a result of this holding, People’s Court procedures
cannot be applied to any future cases, including to Gaddafi’s trial.125 Libya
hailed this decision not only as a demonstration of an impartial judiciary in
Libya but also as an expression of Libya’s intent to conduct fair criminal
trials.126 Second, Libya also submitted that Gaddafi would be able to be tried as
a public officer in Libya127 because even though he did not have a de jure
position within the Libyan government before the Libyan Revolution, he was
the de facto prime minister.128 Libyan law recognizes this distinction, and a

119

Id.
Id. at 25.
121 Admissibility Hearing Day 2 Transcript, supra note 54, at 25.
122 Id. at 26.
123 See generally Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11,
Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif alIslam Gaddafi (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1545015.pdf [hereinafter Libya’s Further
Submissions].
124 Id. paras. 75–76.
125 Id. para. 77.
126 See id. para. 76.
127 Id. paras. 84–85.
128 Id. para. 85.
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showing that a person holds de facto public office allows that person to be
charged with crimes that may only be committed by public officers.129
Libya also detailed the international assistance it received in relation to its
criminal justice system.130 A large share of the international support to Libya
came from the U.N. Support Mission in Libya, which traveled across Libya to:
(1) discuss issues of transitional justice with local political and community
leaders; (2) advise Libya on its detention centers and help facilitate transfers to
government-controlled facilities in Tripoli; (3) work with Libya to increase its
prison capacity; (4) advise the Libyan Ministry of Justice on how to reconcile
Libyan laws with international standards and develop programs for public
defenders and military prosecutors; and (5) hold workshops for judges and
prosecutors to prepare them for litigation involving serious crimes.131 Libya
also received funding and training from the European Union and other
countries.132
The OTP submitted a response to the submissions made by Libya on
February 12, 2013.133 Among other things, the OTP uncovered that Libyan law
actually does allow for in abstentia trials.134 The OTP retracted this statement a
week later stating that whether Libya can conduct an in abstentia trial is
irrelevant because, by implication, such a proceeding admits that Libya could
not obtain the accused.135 There was no indication that this change of mind
signified that the OTP had also stopped believing Libya was not genuinely able
to prosecute Gaddafi.136 In either case, these arguments negate the claim by the
OPCD that the lack of in absentia trials made the prosecution of Gaddafi
otherwise unable to proceed.

129

Id.
See generally id. paras. 103–13.
131 See id. paras. 104, 106–10.
132 Id. para. 105.
133 See generally Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11,
Prosecution’s Response to Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on the Issues Related to the
Admissibility of the Case Against Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (Feb. 12, 1013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1551639.pdf.
134 Id. para. 44.
135 Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Prosecution’s
Notice of Withdrawal Regarding a Reference in its Prosecution’s Response to Libyan Government’s Further
Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (ICC-01/1102/22-276-Red2), para. 3 (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1555477.pdf.
136 See id.
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The OPCD also responded to Libya’s submissions after the admissibility
hearing on February 18, 2013.137 In regards to the Libyan Supreme Court
ruling that overturned the People’s Court procedures, the OPCD submitted that
Libyan courts have already acted in opposition to the ruling.138 For example,
Gaddafi was recently brought straight to trial to face charges that were
unrelated to the Libyan Civil War, rather than first being brought to an
accusation chamber as required by Libyan law.139 The OPCD attacked claims
that Libya’s judiciary was impartial based on a law passed by Libya that aimed
to remove judges who had served during Muammar Gaddafi’s regime.140 It
also argued that Libya did not provide enough information to alleviate
concerns that the lack of security would dissuade witnesses from testifying,
making legal proceedings “otherwise unavailable.”141 Finally, the OPCD
dismissed the international assistance received by Libya as either irrelevant to
the Gaddafi case or charged that Libya was too vague in explaining its
relevance.142
C. Developments In Libya Since the Admissibility Challenge
Since the admissibility challenge there have been other indicia of Libya’s
ability to investigate and prosecute Gaddafi. For instance, Libya was able to
secure the extradition of al-Senussi from Mauritania for $200 million.143 This
may be an indication that Libya has the resources available to carry out further
investigations and prosecute Gaddafi. Additionally, Libya held its first “fully
free parliamentary election” since 1952, with a voter turnout of roughly sixtytwo percent.144 The new government should soon begin drafting a new
constitution for the country.145 The new non-transitional government is
expected to appoint a new Prosecutor-General who will then be responsible for
137 See generally Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11,
Public Redacted Version of the Response to the Libyan Government’s Further Submissions on Issues Related
to Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1555252.pdf.
138 Id. para. 169.
139 Id.
140 Id. paras.170–73.
141 Id. paras. 222–57.
142 Id. para. 284.
143 Grant, supra note 45.
144 See Libya Election Success for Secularist Jibril’s Bloc, BBC NEWS (July 18, 2012), http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-africa-18880908.
145 Hadeel al Shalchi & Marie-Louise Gumuchian, Libya’s Jibril in Election Landslide over Islamists,
REUTERS (July 12, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/12/us-libya-elections-idUSBRE86B0JI2
0120712.
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transferring Gaddafi from Zintan to “purpose-built trial and detention
facilities” in Tripoli.146
However, progress has been met with major setbacks. For instance, the lack
of security persisted after the parties submitted their motions on the
admissibility challenge. In what was called “one of the worst breakdowns in
security in [Tripoli] since Muammar Gaddafi’s fall,” rival militias fought each
other on November 4, 2012, resulting in five people being wounded and an
intelligence building being set on fire.147 More notable to Americans was the
attack on the American embassy in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, which
claimed the life of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and other consulate
employees.148 However, there is some evidence that Libyan security forces had
word of the attack weeks before and warned the U.S. Embassy of the
impending attack.149
II. THE CHAMBER’S DECISION
The Chamber issued its decision rejecting Libya’s admissibility challenge
on May 31, 2013.150 The Chamber did not base its decision on Libya’s ability
to investigate or prosecute Gaddafi, but on whether Libya was investigating the
same case as the ICC.151 However, the Chamber’s holding on whether Libya
was investigating the same case was informed, at least in part, by the
Chamber’s opinion on whether Libya was genuinely able to investigate and
prosecute Gaddafi.152 Thus, to understand the Chamber’s opinion on Libya’s
ability in context and why the Chamber got its analysis wrong, it is important
to first understand the Chamber’s decision on whether Libya was investigating
the same case as the ICC and then discuss the Chamber’s decision regarding
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Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 29.
UPDATE 4-Rival Libya Militias Battle on Streets of Tripoli, REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2012, 12:31 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/04/libya-attack-idUSL5E8M42RE20121104.
148 Benghazi US Consulate Attack: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-africa-19587068.
149 See Julian Pecquet, Timeline of Libya Consulate Attack Reveals Administration Contradictions, HILL
(Oct. 14, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/terrorism/261839-timeline-of-libya-attackreveals-administration-contradictions.
150 Admissibility Decision, supra note 10.
151 Id. paras. 134–35.
152 Id. para. 137. As a general matter, the analysis of an admissibility challenge is a two-step process. Id.
para. 58. First is whether a state with jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the same case as the ICC. Id.
If the answer is in the affirmative, then the second question is whether the state is genuinely willing or able to
investigate or prosecute the accused. Id. See infra Part II.B.1 for a fuller discussion of this two-step analysis.
147
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Libya’s ability to genuinely investigate and prosecute Gaddafi. Each issue will
be taken in turn.
A. Whether Libya was Investigating the “Same Case”
As noted by the Chamber, the determination of an admissibility challenge
consists of two steps: first, whether the state with jurisdiction is investigating
or prosecuting the same case as the ICC, and second, if the answer is in the
affirmative, whether the state is genuinely able and willing to prosecute the
accused.153 With regard to the defining the same “case” that is before the ICC,
the Chamber looked to whether the state is investigating or prosecuting the
same person for substantially the same conduct alleged before the ICC.154
While it was generally not an issue whether Libya was investigating the same
person as the ICC, the Chamber was concerned about whether Libya was
investigating and could prosecute Gaddafi for the same conduct.155
First, the Chamber characterized the exact nature of the conduct that was
alleged before the ICC and used that characterization as the basis for its
analysis concerning whether Libya was investigating substantially the same
conduct.156 The Chamber defined such conduct as Gaddafi using “the Security
Forces under his control to kill and persecute hundreds of civilian
demonstrators alleged dissidents to Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, across Libya,
in particular in Benghazi, Misrata, Tripoli and other neighbouring cities” from
February 15 to 28 of 2011.157 It is with that characterization that the Chamber
then turned to whether Libya had sufficient legislation to investigate and
prosecute Gaddafi for crimes that encompassed that conduct and whether
Libya was actually investigating said conduct.158
Ultimately, the Chamber held that Libya’s current legislation could allow
for the investigation and prosecution of Gaddafi for the conduct that was
alleged before the ICC.159 In arriving at that conclusion, the Chamber noted
that it was not necessary for Libya to enact legislation that would allow them
to prosecute Gaddafi for international crimes, despite prior suggestions by

153
154
155
156
157
158
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Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, para. 58.
Id. paras. 58, 76–77.
See generally id.
Id. para. 83.
Id. para. 83.
Id. paras. 84–88, 106–37.
Id. para. 113.
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Libya that it was going to enact such legislation.160 Even still, the Chamber
was concerned that the fact that Gaddafi did not hold an official position within
his father’s regime would prevent Libya from being able to prosecute him.161
Despite this reservation, the Chamber found that, at least from a legal
perspective, Libya had the ability to charge and prosecute Gaddafi for crimes
that encompassed the conduct alleged before the ICC.162
The Chamber then questioned whether Libya was actually investigating
Gaddafi for the same conduct alleged before the ICC.163 Under this inquiry, the
Chamber looked to the documents, witness statements, and other evidence
provided by Libya to demonstrate its investigation of Gaddafi.164 First, the
Chamber noted that the witness statements provided by Libya do have
“discrete aspects of the conduct alleged” before the ICC.165 Moreover, the
Chamber was not particularly concerned with the authentication, or lack
thereof, of the intercept evidence relied upon by Libya.166 However, documents
provided by Libya, which were relevant to the investigation of Gaddafi, did not
contain enough specific information to allow the Chamber to discern the scope
and nature of the investigation.167 Overall, the Chamber observed that, while
the evidence presented did indicate that Libya was taking steps to hold Gaddafi
criminally responsible for his acts, the evidence did not rise to the standard
required to demonstrate that Libya was investigating Gaddafi for the same
conduct.168 Thus, the Chamber held that Libya had not demonstrated that it
was investigating Gaddafi for the same case as the ICC, thus making the case
admissible.169 However, the Chamber then went a step further, rejecting
Libya’s request to make further submissions of evidence because such further
evidence “would not be determinative at this stage because . . . serious
concerns remain with respect to . . . Libya’s ability genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution against Mr. Gaddafi.”170 Thus, the Chamber then
turned to determining whether Libya was able to investigate Gaddafi.
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Id. paras. 84–88.
Id. para. 109.
Id. para. 113.
Id. para.114.
See generally id. paras. 115–31.
Id. para.121.
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B. Whether Libya Is Genuinely Able to Investigate and Prosecute Gaddafi
There are two important aspects of the Chamber’s analysis of Libya’s
ability to investigate Gaddafi. The first aspect is the substance of the
Chamber’s analysis, i.e., those facts upon which the Chamber relied in making
its ultimate determination. The second aspect is the form of the Chamber’s
analysis and how the analysis compared to Article 17(3). This Comment will
take each in turn.
1. The Substance of the Chamber’s Inability Analysis
At the outset of its discussion, the Chamber held that, despite progress
made by the Libyan government since acquiring power, Libya’s national
judicial system was unavailable to Gaddafi.171 It made this determination
without any discussion as to whether the national judicial system was also in a
state of substantial or total collapse, or why the national judicial system was
unavailable as opposed to being collapsed.172 The Chamber based its decision
that Libya’s judicial system was unavailable on three main points.
First, the Chamber observed that Libya was unable to obtain Gaddafi.173
The Chamber noted that Gaddafi was still under the custody of the Zintan
militia and had yet to be transferred to Libya since his capture on November
19, 2011.174 The Chamber did not believe, despite Libya’s assurances, that any
transfer would be conducted in the near future.175 Further, the Chamber stated
that in abstentia trials are not available under Libyan law and, as a
consequence, Gaddafi’s trial could not take place until Gaddafi was transferred
to Tripoli.176
Second, the Chamber was also concerned that Libya would be unable to
obtain some witness statements for the trial against Gaddafi.177 The Chamber
observed that some witnesses that Libya expressed it wanted to interview have
not yet been interviewed because those witnesses, like Gaddafi, are still not
under Libyan control.178 The Chamber was concerned that some witnesses
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Id. paras. 204–05.
See generally id.
Id. paras. 206–08.
Id. paras. 206–07.
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Id. paras. 209–11.
Id. para. 210.
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under Libyan control have been subjected to torture in Libyan prisons, thus
calling Libya’s ability to protect such witnesses into question.179 There was
also concern that unclear evidence regarding witness protection programs in
Libya would be a hindrance to witnesses being willing to testify in Gaddafi’s
case.180
Finally, the Chamber also found that Libya would be otherwise unable to
carry out its proceedings against Gaddafi because he had not yet selected
defense counsel, nor had Libya appointed an attorney to represent him.181 In
particular, the Chamber was concerned that finding a defense attorney for
Gaddafi would be difficult not only because of the security situation in Libya,
but also because of “the risk faced by lawyers who act for associates of the
former regime.”182 This concern was amplified by the fact that Libya had tried
to secure counsel for Gaddafi by contacting local law societies without
success, though the extent of how much effort was expended and how difficult
it had been to secure an attorney is unclear.183 The Chamber was worried that
Libya would be unable to find representation for Gaddafi and, as a result, be
unable to move forward with the prosecution, thus rendering the national
justice system unavailable.184
In conclusion, the Chamber noted that despite the fact that “authorities for
the administration of justice may exist and function in Libya, a number of legal
and factual issues result in the unavailability of the national justice system for
the purpose of the case against Mr. Gaddafi.”185 Therefore, according to the
Chamber, Libya was genuinely unable to investigate and prosecute Gaddafi.186
2. The Structure of the Chamber’s Inability Analysis
What is particularly important about the Chamber’s analysis of the inability
question is the comparison of the language of Article 17(3) and the elements
on which the Chamber focused in its analysis. At the beginning of its findings
on Libya’s ability to investigate Gaddafi, the Chamber recited Article 17(3),
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Id. para. 212.
Id. para. 213.
Id. para. 214.
Id. para. 215.
Id.
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which defines inability for the purposes of an admissibility challenge.187
Article 17(3) states that a Chamber “shall consider whether, due to a total and
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise is unable to carry out its proceedings.”188 After reciting the Rome
Statute’s inability definition, the Chamber then lists the applicable Libyan law
that give Libyan authorities the ability to charge Gaddafi with specific ordinary
crimes, to carry out proceedings against him, and to collect admissible
evidence for the case.189
There are some significant points with regard to the structure of the
Chamber’s analysis that should be noted. The Chamber begins its findings with
a determination that Libya’s national judicial system is “unavailable” as
opposed to being collapsed.190 Despite this determination, there is no
discussion as to why Libya’s national judicial system is “unavailable” rather
than being in a state of substantial or total collapse.191 In fact, the only
justification that the Chamber gives for finding that Libya’s national judicial
system is unavailable is that “it is apparent from the submissions [of the
parties] that multiple challenges remain and that Libya continues to face
substantial difficulties in exercising its judicial powers fully across the entire
territory.”192 However, the Chamber did not elaborate immediately on what
those difficulties are; rather, the Chamber noted that the difficulties that render
the national justice system unavailable “are further explained below.”193 Those
difficulties are also the reasons why, in the Chamber’s view, Libya is unable to
obtain Gaddafi, testimony, and otherwise carry out its proceedings.194
The Chamber’s lack of analysis concerning the unavailability of Libya’s
national judicial system is deficient for determining inability under Article
17(3). In fact, a clear understanding of complementarity and the development
of the inability exception not only demonstrate why the analysis of the
Chamber is deficient, but also why the Chamber should have ruled in favor of
Libya. In the next Part, this Comment will discuss the development of
complementarity and the inability exception, its current understanding by the
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Id. para. 199; accord Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17, para. 3.
Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17, para. 3; Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, para. 199.
See Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, paras. 201–02.
Id. para. 205.
See id. paras. 204–05.
Id. para. 205.
Id.
See id. paras. 206–14
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ICC, the notion of positive complementarity, and the post-challenge
procedures that are applicable when the ICC finds a case inadmissible.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE INABILITY EXCEPTION
This Part will first discuss complementarity and the role it plays in
determining the admissibility of a case generally followed by Subpart A, which
will discuss the history of Article 17; Subpart B, which will discuss the modern
interpretation of the Article; Subpart C, which will discuss the concept of
positive complementarity; and Subpart D, which will discuss procedural
elements after an admissibility challenge has been submitted. The issue of
admissibility is defined in Article 17 of the Rome Statute and has been
described as the Statute’s “cornerstone.”195 The determination of admissibility
may be reached by three tests: complementarity, covered under Article
17(1)(a) and 17(1)(b); ne bis in idem, covered under Article 17(1)(c); and
gravity, under Article 17(1)(d).196 This Comment is chiefly concerned with the
tests provided for under complementarity because it is under this test that
inability of a state to investigate or prosecute may become an issue. Inability is
particularly relevant here because Libya offers a unique situation to analyze the
inability exception. Inability is also relevant because, depending on if and how
the Chamber decides this issue in the context of recent developments in Libya,
the exception could “become a tool for overly harsh assessments of the judicial
machinery in developing countries.”197
The Rome Statute outlines two ways in which the ICC may otherwise find
the case admissible. Under Article 17(1)(a), a case is admissible if the state is
currently investigating or prosecuting the same case as the ICC but the state “is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution” of
the case.198 Likewise, in Article 17(1)(b), a case is admissible if the state
investigated the case and decided not to prosecute the defendant before the
ICC, and “the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State
genuinely to prosecute.”199 In essence, if there is no investigation or
prosecution, or there has not been an investigation and subsequent decision not

195

Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17: Issues of Admissibility, in COMMENTARY ON
605, 606 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008).

THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
196 See id.
197
198
199

Id. at 624.
Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17, para. 1(a).
Id. art. 17(1)(b).

PITTS GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

BEING ABLE TO PROSECUTE SAIF AL-ISLAM GADDAFI

5/1/2014 9:18 AM

1315

to prosecute, then the case is admissible to the ICC.200 Article 17 also defines
“inability” in Article 17(3), stating that a state is unable to investigate or
prosecute the accused when “due to a total or substantial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry
out its proceedings.”201
In addition to Article 17, there are two more aspects of an admissibility
challenge that are important in consideration of the Gaddafi case. First, the
Appeals Chamber has held that “the admissibility of a case must be determined
on the basis of the facts as they exist at the time of the proceedings concerning
the admissibility challenge.”202 This requirement recognizes that the
admissibility of a case may change. To support this holding, the Appeals
Chamber has pointed to Article 19(10) of the Rome Statute.203 Second, the
state challenging the admissibility of a case “bears the burden of proof to show
that the case is inadmissible.”204
To determine whether the Chamber may find that Libya is able to
investigate and prosecute Gaddafi, it is pertinent to look to the development of
the “inability” exception of the complementarity test, the principles of classic
and positive complementarity, and the procedures the ICC has for the
determination and possible re-consideration of a case’s admissibility.

200 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8,
Judgement on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June
2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, para. 78 (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc746819.pdf [hereinafter Katanga Appeal]. It should be observed that the Chamber may find that Libya is
currently not investigating the case against Gaddafi and, consequently, find the case admissible. See
Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision Requesting
Further Submissions on Issues Related to the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, para. 14
(Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1522448.pdf. [hereinafter Requesting Further
Submissions]. An admissibility challenge must be determined “on the circumstances prevailing at the time of”
the decision. See id. (citation omitted). After the admissibility hearing, the Chamber requested further evidence
from Libya that it had carried out further investigations on the Gaddafi case after submitting its admissibility
challenge in May 2012. Id. The Chamber noted that such evidence was necessary “for Libya to discharge its
burden of proof that currently there is not a situation of ‘inaction’ at the national level.” Id.
201 Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17, para. 3.
202 Katanga Appeal, supra note 200, para. 56.
203 Id. Article 19(10) of the Rome Statute allows prosecutors to review admissibility decisions if “new
facts have arisen which negate the basis on which the case had previously been found inadmissible under
Article 17.” Rome Statute, supra note 11, art 19, para. 10.
204 Requesting Further Submissions, supra note 200, para. 8.
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A. The History of Article 17 and the Complementarity Principle
Understanding the history of the development of the complementarity
principle is important in appreciating how the ICC should decide the
admissibility of a case such as that of Gaddafi and al-Senussi. The ICC can
trace its origin back to 1989 when the U.N. General Assembly asked the
International Law Commission (ILC) to consider creating an international
criminal court while it was drafting a code of international crimes.205 However,
the ILC did not begin to draft a statute for the ICC until 1992, after the General
Assembly voted to make the creation of the Court a priority for the ILC.206 In
1994, New Zealand implored the ILC to include a provision that described the
relationship between the national and international courts and “the respective
roles and complementarity of the national and international processes.”207 This
encouragement contributed toward including complementarity in the Preamble
of a draft later that year by the ILC, which stated that “such a court is intended
to be complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such
trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective.”208 Today, the
Preamble further insists that states have a duty to exercise “criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes,”209 which, with the
principle of complementarity, creates the theoretical possibility of the ICC
having no cases before it.210
Even with the notion that the ICC was to be complementary to the national
courts, the ILC’s draft statute still allowed for concurrent jurisdiction of the
same case between the ICC and national courts.211 Concurrent jurisdiction, of
course, allows for multiple courts to exercise jurisdiction over the same case
simultaneously.212 Both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) were created with concurrent jurisdiction with the respective national
205

See KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT, COMPLEMENTARITY
13 (2000).

AND COOPERATION
206 Id.

207 Observations of Governments on the Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court, 46th Sess., June 29, 1994, para. 35, (1994), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM.,
21 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part I), U.N. Sales No.E.96.V.Z. (Part I) (1994).
208 Rep. of the Working Grp. on the Question of a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court
Revision, Int’l Law Comm’n, 46th Sess., 4/L.491/Rev.2; GAOR, 46th Sess., at 8 (July 14, 1994).
209 Rome Statute, supra note 11, pmbl.
210 John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667, 667 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002)
211 Id. at 670–71.
212 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 928 (9th ed. 2009).

PITTS GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

BEING ABLE TO PROSECUTE SAIF AL-ISLAM GADDAFI

5/1/2014 9:18 AM

1317

courts to prosecute persons for international crimes.213 However, both the
ICTR and the ICTY held primacy over the national courts, wherein the
tribunals could require the national courts to defer to the tribunals and hand
cases over to them.214 Concurrent jurisdiction for the ICC was eliminated with
the Preparatory Committee’s draft of the Rome Statute, which stated that the
ICC would find a case inadmissible if it was “being investigated or prosecuted
by a State . . . unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution.”215 A case would also be held inadmissible if the
state decided not to prosecute a defendant unless the decision itself was based
on a state’s unwillingness or inability.216 This language was adopted, in large
part, in the final version of the Rome Statute.217
A large factor in removing concurrent jurisdiction from the ICC and, in
fact, in the formation of the unwillingness and inability exceptions of the
complementarity test, was the international environment in which the ICC was
created. When the ILC was preparing its draft for the creation of the ICC, the
ICTY had just been created and the Security Council was dealing with the
genocide in Rwanda.218 The Security Council created the ICTY because
Yugoslavia’s functioning criminal justice system at the time was not initiating

213 S.C. Res. 955, art. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May. 25, 1993) (establishing ICTY); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), para. 65, U.N. Doc S/25704 (May 3, 1993); accord
Holmes, supra note 213, at 669.
214 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 213, art. 8(2); S.C. Res. 827, supra note 213, U.N. Secretary-General,
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), para. 65,
U.N. Doc S/25704 (May 3, 1993); accord Holmes, supra note 210, at 669.
215 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–July 17, 1998, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998)
[hereinafter Preparatory Committee Draft].
216 Id.
217 Compare id. (“Having regard to paragraph 3 of the Preamble, the Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where: (a) the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it,
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) the case has
been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person
concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute.”), with Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17 (“Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and
article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry
out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over
it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.”); accord Johan D. van der Vyver, The Principle
of Complementarity and the Rules of Admissibility 6 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
218 Holmes, supra note 210, at 670.

PITTS GALLEYSPROOFS2

1318

5/1/2014 9:18 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

prosecutions against those who were committing war crimes, and the
international community feared that the country might shield those who were
responsible from punishment.219 The ICTR was similarly created by the
Security Council because the genocide crippled Rwanda’s criminal justice
system to the point that it was unable to initiate any criminal proceedings
without substantial international assistance to first rebuild its system.220 During
the formation of the ICC, however, more states supported national
jurisdictional primacy unless the accused were “not prosecuted or duly tried by
national authorities.”221 Thus, the emphasis on creating an international
criminal court that implements complementary jurisdiction, rather than
concurrent, jurisdiction is an indication that state sovereignty is an important,
underlying interest protected in the Statute.222
The introduction and development of the inability exception under Article
17(3) is also crucial to understand how the ICC should view a state as being
unable to investigate or prosecute a defendant. The Preparatory Committee
first introduced a definition of inability in its draft of the statute with very little
controversy.223 Since its introduction, some commentators have noted the
parallel that this exception to the complementarity principle has in common
with the extraordinary circumstances that brought about the creation of the
ICTR.224 The most significant change in this provision of the Statute came
between the Preparatory Committee’s draft and the finalized draft that was
eventually approved. Originally, the inability exception to the complementarity
test allowed a case to be admissible to the ICC if the state could not obtain the
accused, obtain evidence, or otherwise carry out prosecutorial proceedings if
such circumstances were “due to a total or partial collapse or unavailability of
its national judicial system.”225 The “partial collapse” language became a point
of contention in Rome during the final deliberations for the statutory
language.226 According to the objectors, a state could suffer from a partial
collapse of its national judicial system and still be able to conduct an

219

Id. at 668–69.
Id.
221 MISKOWIAK, supra note 205, at 42.
222 Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International
Criminal Justice Between State Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity, in 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED
NATIONS L. 591, 595 (Armin von Bogdandy & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2004).
223 Williams & Schabas, supra note 198, at 610.
224 Holmes, supra note 210, at 668–70.
225 Preparatory Committee Draft, supra note 214, art. 15 (emphasis added).
226 Williams & Schabas, supra note 195, at 612.
220
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investigation or carry out a prosecution in good faith, i.e., genuinely.227 Thus,
based on a suggestion from Mexico, the final language was changed to
“substantial collapse.”228 This change in language is important, of course,
because it narrows the field of admissible cases to the ICC while making other
cases, such as situations where a state is engaged in armed conflict but can
“shift[] resources” or transfer venues in order to effect prosecution,
inadmissible.229
The drafting history of Article 17 points to two important matters that must
be considered when the ICC is determining whether a state is “unable” to
investigate a situation or prosecute a defendant. First, “the complementarity
regime of the [ICC] is designed to protect and serve . . . the sovereignty both of
the State parties and third states.”230 Second, when complementarity is upset, it
must be done only in a narrow set of circumstances reflected in the narrow
language of the “inability” exception contained in Article 17.231 Thus, for a
case to fall within this inability exception, the situation within that state must
be particularly extraordinary.
As stated by one commentator though, the ICC is the “arbiter of its own
jurisdiction” because only it can determine whether a case is admissible.232
Consequently, it is important to examine the current construction of Article
17(1)(a) and 17(3), procedural elements of an admissibility determination, and
how complementarity is currently perceived to gain a better perspective of how
the ICC is able to handle a situation like Libya.
B. Current Construction of Article 17 Provisions
As discussed in above, Article 17 underwent some significant changes
during the drafting process. Today, Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute
provides: “[T]he Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: The
case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over
it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution.”233 Currently, the ICC takes this as a two-part

227
228
229
230
231
232
233

Id.
Id.
Holmes, supra note 210, at 677.
Benzing, supra note 222, at 595 (emphasis in original).
See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17.
Holmes, supra note 210, at 672.
Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17, para. 1(a).
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inquiry.234 First, it must determine whether a state is actively investigating or
prosecuting the accused. Thus, if a state is “inactive” in prosecuting a
particular case, the case is admissible. Second, if a state is investigating or
prosecuting a case, then the case only becomes admissible if that state is
“unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out” the proceedings.
1. Whether There Is an Actual Investigation
In order to keep the Gaddafi trial, Libya must first establish it is actively
investigating the case against Gaddafi and must show that the case
“encompass[es] both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the
case before the [ICC].”235 During the admissibility hearing, the OTP argued
that Libya was both “taking the same serious tack and the serious approach that
the OTP brought to [Gaddafi’s] investigation” and that Libya was “tak[ing]
concrete steps to investigate [Gaddafi] for substantially the same conduct.”236
However, after Gaddafi made a court appearance in Zintan on January 17,
2012, a spokesman for the prosecutor told reporters that the “[i]nvestigations
for trying [Gaddafi] for war crimes are over and he will be put on trial for that
at a later time.”237 Such a statement could be a reason for the Chamber to deny
Libya’s admissibility challenge because there must be either an active
investigation or prosecution and, by this statement, there is apparently
neither.238 Ultimately, the Chamber found that Libya did not provide sufficient
evidence to establish that it was investigating Gaddafi for the same case as
alleged in the ICC.239 Assuming the Chamber had found that Libya was
actually investigating the case against Gaddafi and that Libya was not
genuinely unwilling to prosecute Gaddafi, the next question would be whether
Libya was genuinely able to investigate and prosecute Gaddafi.

234 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial
Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Document into the Record of the Case
Against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, art. 58, paras. 30, 32 (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc236260.pdf [hereinafter Dyilo Warrant].
235 Id. para. 31.
236 Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 55–56.
237 Ali Shuaib, Gaddafi’s Son Appears in Libyan Court for First Time, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2013, 10:49
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/17/us-libya-gaddafi-idUSBRE90G0QR20130117.
238 Kevin Jon Heller, Libya Admits It Should Lose Its Complementarity Challenge Re: Saif, OPINIO JURIS
(Jan. 18, 2013, 12:53 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/18/libya-admits-it-should-lose-its-complementaritychallenge-re-saif/.
239 Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, paras. 134–37.
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2. Whether Libya is Genuinely Able to Investigate and Prosecute
Article 17(3) sets out the definition for a state being genuinely unable to
carry out proceedings. It states that “the Court shall consider whether, due to a
total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the
State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony
or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”240 It is not enough, as the
Chamber did, to merely show that the state is unable to investigate or obtain
the accused.241 To meet the inability standard of Article 17(3) it would have to
be shown that Libya is unable to do so because there has been a total or
substantial collapse of the national judicial system or that the justice system is
unavailable.242
The OTP tried to set some rough definitions for these phrases with its 2003
Informal Expert Paper (Informal Expert Paper).243 Aside from discussing the
more philosophical side of complementarity,244 the Informal Expert Paper also
discussed the more practical application of complementarity and, especially,
the inability exception. First, the OTP observed that even though a
determination of inability may be easier than any determination of
unwillingness, the ICC should still remain cautious in its application of
inability because of sovereignty issues.245 It concluded that any inability
standard “should be a stringent one.”246 However, what constitutes a collapsed
judicial system and an unavailable judicial system is still very ambiguous and,
potentially, very broad.247 Thus, the OTP also listed these following factors as
being indicative, though perhaps not dispositive, of a collapsed or unavailable
criminal justice system: “lack of necessary personnel, judges, investigators,
prosecutor; lack of judicial infrastructure; lack of substantive or procedural

240

Id. art. 17, para. 3.
Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, paras. 205, 215.
242 Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute
on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255, 264 (2006); INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR, NO. ICC-01/04-01/07, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN
PRACTICE 15 (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc654724.pdf.
243 The Informal Expert Paper came about as the OTP was trying to decide how its office would deal with
issues of complementarity in practice. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 242, at 2. The paper reflects a
collaborative work between the OTP and a variety of experts known for their research about the topic of
complementarity. Id.
244 See id. at 3–4.
245 Id. at 15.
246 Id.
247 See Gregory S. McNeal, ICC Inability Determinations in Light of the Dujail Case, 39 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 325, 325–28 (2006).
241
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penal legislation rendering [the] system ‘unavailable’; lack of access rendering
[the] system ‘unavailable’; obstruction by uncontrolled elements rendering
[the] system unavailable; [and] amnesties, immunities rendering [the] system
‘unavailable.’” 248
It should be noted that in Gaddafi’s case, the OTP still appeared to be
following the criteria outlined in the Informal Expert Paper. In its response to
Libya’s admissibility challenge, the OTP was particularly concerned about
Gaddafi’s lack of access to the Libyan criminal justice system because he had
yet to receive a defense lawyer within Libya.249 It noted that without a defense
attorney, Libya would be unable to charge Gaddafi and complete “the
investigation under Libyan law.”250 Moreover, it observed that the Zintan
militia’s control over Gaddafi may be playing a part in obstructing Gaddafi
from receiving a defense attorney.251 This concern would therefore likely be
listed in the “lack of access rendering the system unavailable” factor.
However, lack of access to an attorney may not be enough under Article
17(3) to make a criminal system “unavailable” to the defendant. For instance,
there may be unavailability “on account of legislative impediments, such as an
amnesty law, or a statute of limitations, making it impossible for the national
judge to commence proceedings against the suspect or the accused.”252
Moreover, a collapsed or unavailable judicial system is not one that lacks or
denies due process rights to the accused, but rather exists because of “a
political situation that makes holding trials impossible or a debilitating lack of
judges, prosecutors, and other court personnel.”253 This distinction is key; for a
state to be unable under Article 17(3) it is not enough that the state is prevented
“from fairly investigating or prosecuting,” the state must be prevented from
“effectively investigating or prosecuting the accused.”254 As indicated above,
the Libyan Criminal Procedure Code allows for a suspect to have an attorney at
the investigation stage if one is desired.255 In the case of Gaddafi, there have

248

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 242, at 15.
Prosecutor’s Admissibility Response, supra note 16, para. 41.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 344 (2d ed. 2008).
253 Heller, supra note 242, at 264.
254 Id.. The fact that the Rome Statute does not seem to protect international standards of due process, or
any due process for that matter, is not lost upon the author of this comment or Professor Heller. See id. at 265
for a deeper discussion of the issue.
255 Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Libyan
Government’s Filing of Compilation of Libyan Law Referred to in Its Admissibility Challenge, 2 (May 28,
249
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apparently been conflicting reports as to whether Gaddafi actually wants
defense counsel; on one hand, Libyan authorities are told that Gaddafi does not
want counsel, and, on the other hand, Gaddafi requested Libyan defense
counsel from the OPCD.256 Regardless, once Gaddafi’s case reaches trial in
Libya, defense counsel will be appointed because having defense counsel is
required under Libyan law.257 In sum, being without representation, at least at
this time, is not enough to declare that Libya is not able to investigate or
prosecute Gaddafi under the definition of Article 17(3).
Finally, it must be stressed that to qualify under the inability exception, the
state must be “genuinely” unable to investigate or prosecute the case.258 The
word “genuinely” is included to prevent any national action as precluding
interference with the ICC.259 Thus, at least under the OTP’s interpretation of
the term, the issue with genuineness is “whether the proceedings are so
inadequate that they cannot be considered ‘genuine’ proceedings.”260 As noted
above, the OTP asserted at the admissibility hearing that it appeared to it that
Libya was investigating the case against Gaddafi at least as seriously as the
OTP.261 This means that under the OTP’s own definition of “genuine,” Libya
is genuinely investigating Gaddafi as required under Article 17(1)(a).
C. Positive Complementarity
Since the development of complementarity in the drafting of the Statute,
both commentators and the ICC have discovered two sides to its
implementation: passive complementarity and positive (or proactive)
complementarity. Passive complementarity entails a strict adherence to Article
17 of the Rome Statute, whereby the Prosecutor and the ICC will only
investigate and prosecute a suspect “where national governments fail to
prosecute and where the Court has jurisdiction.”262 Positive complementarity
provides a more hands-on approach to international criminal justice, allowing
the ICC to use its resources to encourage and even assist national governments

2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1418852.pdf (citing CODE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [C. CRIM.
PRO.] art. 106 (Libya)); Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, para. 59.
256 Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 20.
257 Id.
258 Williams & Schabas, supra note 195, at 617.
259 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 242, para. 22.
260 Id. para. 23.
261 Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 55–56.
262 William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National
Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 56 (2008).
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in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes.263 In contrast, if
the ICC had concurrent jurisdiction and primacy over national courts, it could
simply require the state to hand it the case and “accept the fact that certain
domestic crimes are really international in character and endanger international
peace and that such international crimes should be tried by an international
tribunal.”264 Early on, it appeared as if the Prosecutor and the ICC would adopt
a more passive approach to complementarity.265 However, some have
suggested that this early policy was aimed at filling the ICC’s docket rather
than trying to help states meet their duty to prosecute.266
The OTP has expressed its willingness to take on a positive or proactive
approach to the complementarity principle. In the Informal Expert Paper, the
OTP recognized that the ICC would still be a success if an international system
were in place whereby every nation was effective in prosecuting international
crimes and no cases were before the Court.267 Viewing complementarity as the
method by which it could “encourage and facilitate the compliance of states
with their primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute core crimes,”268
the OTP defined two aspects to guide its decisions on complementarity:
partnership and vigilance.269 Under the partnership aspect, the OTP could
encourage national proceedings, “help develop cooperative anti-impunity
strategies . . . provide advice and certain forms of assistance to facilitate
national efforts,” and possibly “agree that a consensual division of labour is in
the best interests of justice.”270 The vigilance aspect is essentially passive
complementarity: the OTP defined vigilance as the ICC “diligently carry[ing]
out its responsibilities under the Statute.”271The OTP noted that the two aspects
263

Id.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 83 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
265 See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Address at the International Conference in
Nuremburg: Building a Future on Peace and Justice (June 24–25, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/4E466EDB-2B38-4BAF-AF5F-005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.
pdf (“[F]or each situation in which the ICC is exercising jurisdiction, we can hear voices challenging judicial
decisions, their timing, their timeliness, asking the Prosecution to use its discretionary powers to adjust to the
situations on the ground, to indict or withdraw indictments according to short term political goals . . . . These
proposals are not consistent with the Rome Statute”).
266 William A. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 CRIM. L.F.
5, 6 (2008) (“[F]rom the beginning of the work of the International Criminal Court, there have been iniatives
aimed at attracting cases for prosecution rather than insisting that States fulfill their obligations.”).
267 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 242, para. 1.
268 Id. para. 2.
269 Id. para. 3.
270 Id.
271 Id.
264
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do not work to the mutual exclusion of one another, but rather work in tandem
to help the State overcome “shortcomings in the national proceedings” and
“complementarity fact-finding activities will often encourage genuine and
effective national proceedings.”272 Finally, the OTP observed that there may be
a statutory basis for positive complementarity in Article 93(10) of the Rome
Statute.273 Article 93(10) states that “[t]he Court may, upon request, cooperate
with and provide assistance to a State Party conducting an investigation into or
trial in respect of conduct which constitutes a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court.”274
From its thoughts on partnership and vigilance, we can see that the OTP is
amenable to a supportive relationship between the ICC and the state whose
ability to carry out an investigation or prosecution of a person accused of a
crime is questionable. During the admissibility hearing, Libya suggested that
such a relationship may take the form of the OTP monitoring the trial in Libya
with the option of reporting back to the ICC if necessary.275 Libya also
suggested that the ICC could put conditions on a finding of inadmissibility by
requiring all of the parties to report back periodically.276 Moreover, Libya has
actually requested such help, not only from the ICC but from the United
Nations and other organizations, in order to strengthen its judiciary and to
“provide specialized training for judges and prosecutors.”277 This Comment
will next focus on procedures available to the Chamber that may allow it to
take a more positive approach to the admissibility of Gaddafi’s case.
D. Procedural Elements After an Admissibility Challenge
There are numerous provisions within the Rome Statute and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (RPE) that deal with the issue of admissibility after a
challenge of admissibility has been submitted to a pre-trial chamber.278
If the Chamber had held that the Gaddafi case was inadmissible, such a
decision would not necessarily be the final determination on the matter. Under

272

Id. para. 4.
Id. para. 10 (“Article 93(10) of the [Rome] Statute . . . contemplates ICC assistance to national
investigations and prosecutions”).
274 Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 93(10).
275 Admissibility Hearing Day 2 Transcript, supra note 54, at 50.
276 Id.
277 Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, para. 97; see also supra notes 149–51.
278 See Johan D. van der Vyver, Trigger Mechanisms and Admissibility Constraints 74 (2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), for a greater discussion of these provisions.
273
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Article 19(10) of the Rome Statute, if such a case was inadmissible, the
Prosecutor still would still have the option to request a review of admissibility
from the same pre-trial chamber which offered the original holding.279 This
request could occur once “new facts have arisen which negate the basis on
which the case had previously been found inadmissible.”280 Once the
Prosecutor makes such a request, the state whose challenge led to the
inadmissibility decision will be notified of the request and given time to
respond.281 According to Rule 59 of the RPE, interested parties, such as the
organization or state who referred the situation to the ICC and the victims of
the defendant’s crimes, will also be notified of the request made by the
Prosecutor and may be given time to respond to the Prosecutor’s request.282
Accordingly, a determination of inadmissibility does not preclude the ICC
from being able to reopen the Gaddafi case if circumstances arise that
definitively prove Libya as being unable to handle it. Libya commented on the
statutory scheme during the first day of the admissibility hearing, stating that
the Rome Statute only allows a state to challenge admissibility of a case
once.283 If the Chamber had found that a case is inadmissible, that holding
could always be reconsidered in light of new facts surrounding the
investigation or the prosecution. 284 On the other hand, once a case is found to
be admissible, that decision is final.285 Being able to regain jurisdiction over a
defendant if new circumstances arise which conflict with a previous
determination of inadmissibility fits perfectly with the concept of “positive
complementarity” discussed above.
In considering not only why the Chamber was wrong in denying Libya’s
admissibility challenge, but also how the Chamber should have decided the
challenge, it is pertinent to review a case in which another Chamber discussed
the issue of inability. The next Part of this Comment discusses the case of
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Bemba) and its discussion of a state’s inability.

279

Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 19, para. 10.
Id.
281 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Mar. 13–31, 2000, June 12–30, 2000,
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: Finalized Draft Text of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 62(2), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.1 (July 12, 2000).
282 Id. rule 59(1).
283 Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 50; see also Rome Statute, supra note 11,
art. 19, para. 4.
284 Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 50.
285 Id.
280
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IV. THE CASE OF JEAN-PIERRE BEMBA GOMBO AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO
LIBYA’S ADMISSIBILITY CHALLENGE
One case in which the ICC addressed the issue of the inability of a state
was Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. This case is of particular
importance because the OPCD relied on it to claim that the Court has held that
a state’s belief as to its ability to prosecute is irrelevant and that the ICC has
the responsibility to determine admissibility.286 Bemba was the Vice-President
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)287 and the leader of the
Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), which allied with the President of
the CAR during an armed conflict that occurred between October 26, 2002 and
March 15, 2003.288 During this conflict, Bemba committed crimes against
humanity within the CAR, particularly in the cities of Bangui, Boy-Rabé, and
Mongoumba.289 A prosecutor for a superior court in the CAR originally
investigated this case, and the senior investigating judge initiated legal
proceedings against Bemba for using troops to “undermine the security of the
CAR and with aiding and abetting murder, rape and pillage.”290 However, the
same judge eventually dropped the charges against Bemba, citing Bemba’s
diplomatic immunity as the Vice-President of the DRC and the lack of
sufficient incriminating evidence.291 An appeal followed until the Procureur
Général, the prosecutor for the Bangui Court of Appeal, requested that the
court refer the situation to the ICC.292 On December 16, 2004, the Indictment
Chamber of the Bangui Court of Appeal granted that request.293 The CAR’s
Cour de Cassation affirmed this judgment, holding that the “CAR judicial
services are clearly unable to investigate or prosecute the alleged
perpetrators.”294
Eventually the case against Bemba made its way to a Trial Chamber of the
ICC, where it considered, inter alia, whether the judge’s decision to drop the
charges against Bemba constituted an effective investigation and a genuine
decision not to prosecute the accused, thus making Bemba’s case inadmissible
286

Defense’s Admissibility Response, supra note 17, para. 355.
Bemba Admissibility Decision, supra note 93, para. 6.
288 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08; Case Information Sheet, http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/BembaEng.pdf [hereinafter Bemba Case Information Sheet].
289 Id.
290 Bemba Admissibility Decision, supra note 93, paras. 2–3.
291 Id. para. 6
292 Id. paras. 7–9.
293 Id. para. 12.
294 Id. para. 15.
287
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before the ICC under Article 17(1)(b).295 The defense argued that the CAR was
able to prosecute Bemba for several reasons. First, there was “no cessation of
activities . . . with respect to the [CAR] judicial system.”296 The defense also
pointed out that the CAR still had means to obtain Bemba, either through an
international arrest warrant or voluntary appearance.297 Moreover, the defense
asserted that the CAR was “fully capable” of obtaining evidence and
concluding the prosecution against Bemba, especially since Bemba was no
longer the vice president of the DRC and thus not protected by diplomatic
immunity.298 In furtherance of this point, the defense pointed to a trial taking
place in courts in Bangui299 and the fact that the CAR had already gathered
more than 203 statements from victims of the crimes of which Bemba was
accused.300 Finally, the defense pointed out the odd contradiction which would
arise if the ICC accepted the Cour de Cassation’s determination that the CAR
was unable to prosecute Bemba because “if the Cour de [C]assation is the
source of reliable judicial determination, doesn’t that tend to prove the
opposite, that is, that the courts of the country are functional?”301
Despite this contradiction, the OTP relied on the Cour de Cassation’s
ruling to argue that the CAR was unable to prosecute Bemba.302 The OTP
additionally asserted that the investigative judge was unable to conduct field
investigations due to security concerns and was unable to interview members
of the MLC, which Bemba led, because they were located in the DRC.303 The
OTP distinguished the defense’s argument by saying that it rested on
295

Id. para. 74.
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Application Challenging the
Admissibility of the Case pursuant to Articles 17 and 19(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, para. 76 (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc881209.pdf [hereinafter Bemba Defense Admissibility Challenge].
297 Id. Bemba was living in Portugal as an exile at the time. Bemba Admissibility Decision, supra note 96,
para. 78.
298 See Bemba Defense Admissibility Challenge, supra note 296, paras. 72, 77.
299 Id. para. 88 n.63.
300 Id. para. 91 n.64.
301 Id. para. 92 (quoting William A. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Creative Solution or a Trap
for the Court?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS (Mauro Politi &
Federico Gioia, eds., 2008)). In fact, the CAR, after referring the Bemba case to the ICC, went on to try AngeFélix Patassé, former President of the CAR. Bemba Case Information Sheet, supra note 291. Patassé was a codefendant with Bemba and resided outside of the CAR at the beginning of his trial. Bemba Defense
Admissibility Challenge, supra note 296, para. 94.
302 See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Prosecution’s Response to
Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Pursuant to
Articles 17 and 19(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, paras. 61–64 (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc881209.pdf [hereinafter OTP’s Admissibility Response to Bemba].
303 See id. para. 62.
296
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combating the notion of a collapsed criminal justice system, rather than the
unavailability of the justice system, the second situation in which inability may
arise under Article 17(3).304 In this regard, the OTP argued that the CAR’s
judicial system was unavailable because the “judiciary was rendered
‘ineffective, unaccountable, corrupt, and dependent on the executive’
following [a prominent Central African politician’s] ascension, thereby
substantiating the argument that the judiciary was genuinely unable to proceed
against the accused.”305 Thus, the OTP argued that these factors pointed to
unavailability and not the collapse of the CAR criminal justice system in
Bemba’s case.306
Ultimately, the Trial Chamber agreed with the CAR and the OTP, though
its concurrence with the arguments of the CAR and OTP constituted obiter
dictum.307 In its discussion, the Trial Chamber relied on submissions by the
CAR that it lacked the human resources, judges, and budget to carry on a trial,
which would be necessary to effectively prosecute Bemba.308 The Trial
Chamber also cited ongoing operations by the MLC that contributed to the
instability of the area as another reason why the CAR was unable to
prosecute.309 Lastly, the Trial Chamber did rely on the Cour de Cassation’s
judgment in which it found that there were neither the “investigative
resources” nor the judicial capacity to handle Bemba’s trial and that the lack of
progress since the Senior Investigative Judge’s dismissal was indicative of this
inability.310
At first, the Bemba case seems to be at odds with the notion of limited
findings of inability. According to the Bemba case, a state can be unable to
prosecute an accused person if the high court simply states that it lacks the
resources, judges, and budget to carry out the proceedings,311 even if the state
actually does have the resources to allow its own high court to make rulings on
304

Id. para. 75.
Bemba Admissibility Decision, supra note 93, para. 107 (citing Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, Case, No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Prosecution’s Response to Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the
Case by the Defence for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Pursuant to Articles 17 and 19(2)(a) of the Rome Statute,
para. 67 (Mar. 29, 2010)).
306 OTP’s Admissibility Response to Bemba, supra note 302, para. 64.
307 See Bemba Admissibility Decision, supra note 93, paras. 242–47. The Trial Chamber III decided that
the dismissal by the Senior Investigating Judge was not a “decision not to prosecute” under Article 17(1)(b),
thereby rendering discussion on inability unnecessary. Id. para. 242.
308 Id. para. 245.
309 Id.
310 Id. para. 246.
311 Id. para. 245.
305
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its own inability.312 Moreover, this finding can be made despite evidence of
other trials taking place in the court system.313 Per the Bemba decision, a state
is unable to prosecute a defendant if there is merely enough instability in a
particular region to prevent an investigating judge from investigating the case.
314
This reason for finding inability of a state to investigate or prosecute for
mere security concerns is in direct contradiction of the change of the wording
of Article 17(3) from partial collapse to substantial collapse, wherein a state
may still be able to investigate or prosecute a case despite suffering some
hindrances of its judicial system.315 Finally, it is observed that the Bemba case
is a situation in which the prosecuting state found itself to be unable to
prosecute Bemba and submitted the case to the ICC.316 Thus, the argument
could be made that the ICC was only able to make this finding of inability on
the part of the CAR because there was no actual sovereignty issue at stake; the
CAR conceded their sovereignty over this case by voluntarily submitting it to
the ICC.
A few key distinctions separate the Bemba case from the situation in Libya
at the time of this writing. First, all indications point to an independent and
impartial judiciary currently in Libya. Libya mentioned in its admissibility
challenge that the Libyan Constitutional Declaration of 2011 provides for an
independent judiciary that is not subject to any other part of the government.317
As evidence of this independence, the judiciary has declared a law passed by
the NTC unconstitutional318 and has done the same thing to the People’s Court
procedures in the Dorda case.319 Thus, the judiciary is not dependent upon the
executive, as was the case in the CAR.320 Second, Libya also seems ready to
invest a large amount of resources into the investigation and possible
prosecution of Gaddafi and al-Senussi. For instance, as mentioned above,
312 See Bemba Defense Admissibility Challenge, supra note 302, para. 92 (quoting William A. Schabas,
Complementarity in Practice: Creative Solution or a Trap for the Court?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 25, 36 (Mauro Politi & Federico Gioia, eds., 2008)).
313 Id. para. 88 n.63.
314 OTP’s Admissibility Response to Bemba, supra note 302, para. 62.
315 Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17, para. 3; Holmes, supra note 210, at 677; see also Williams &
Schabas, supra note 198, at 612.
316 Bemba Admissibility Decision, supra note 93, para. 15.
317 Libya’s Admissibility Motion, supra note 9, paras. 53–54.
318 Defense’s Admissibility Response, supra note 17, para. 316.
319 See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
320 See Bemba Admissibility Decision, supra note 93, para. 107 (citing Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, Case, No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Prosecution’s Response to Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the
Case by the Defence for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Pursuant to Articles 17 and 19(2)(a) of the Rome Statute,
para. 67 (Mar. 29, 2010)).
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Libya reportedly secured the extradition of al-Senussi from Mauritania for
$200 million.321 Libya also indicated at the admissibility hearing that the
investigation team that is investigating the alleged crimes against Gaddafi
comprises no less than twelve people: four senior investigators with two junior
investigators working under each senior investigator.322 Third, Libya did not
refer the Gaddafi case to the ICC; it was a Security Council referral.323 Thus,
unlike the Bemba case, it cannot be said that Libya had ceded jurisdiction over
the case to the ICC. The fact that Libya submitted an admissibility challenge
indicates that it wishes to investigate and prosecute Gaddafi. With regard to the
question of Libya’s genuine ability to investigate and prosecute Gaddafi,
enough differences exist between the situation in Libya and the Bemba case to
distinguish Libya from the CAR and point to Libya being genuinely able to
pursue Gaddafi’s prosecution.
V. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF GADDAFI’S CASE: WHY THE CHAMBER IS WRONG
AND WHAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED
This Part will discuss two questions. First, it will discuss why the Chamber
was wrong not only it is conclusion, but in the structure of its analysis. Second,
it will discuss how the Chamber should have decided the question of
admissibility. Each question will be taken in turn.
A. The Chamber’s Deficient Analysis and Obiter Dictum
The Chamber’s analysis of Libya’s genuine ability to prosecute Gaddafi is
undermined by the fact that the analysis is insufficient in light of the text of
Article 17(3). Moreover, the Chamber’s analysis is arguably obiter dictum,
thus reducing the authoritative value of its decision.
1. The Chamber’s Analysis in Light of Article 17(3)
As noted above, it is not enough to show that Libya is unable to obtain the
accused, evidence, or otherwise carry out its proceedings; it must be unable to
do these things because of a substantial or total collapse or the unavailability of
the national judicial system.324 Moreover, the development of the inability
exception suggests that the drafters of the Rome Statute desired a high
321
322
323
324

Grant, supra note 42.
Admissibility Hearing Day 2 Transcript, supra note 54, at 43.
S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 3, para. 4.
Heller, supra note 242, at 264–65; OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 242, para. 49.
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threshold to be met before a state’s national judicial system could be
determined to be collapsed or unavailable for the purposes of Article 17(3).325
In light of the development of Article 17(3), the Chamber’s inability
analysis is deficient because it fails to adequately explain why the difficulties
that it highlights in its analysis make the Libyan judicial system substantially
or totally unavailable.326 For instance, the Chamber asserted that Libya is
unable to obtain Gaddafi because Libya has not yet transferred Gaddafi from
Zintan to Tripoli and this fact renders the judicial system unavailable.327
However, the Court does not discuss why this makes the national judicial
system unavailable when Libya has continued to investigate Gaddafi for the
alleged crimes; Libya has continued to build facilities that will be adequate to
house and secure Gaddafi for his trial in Tripoli, and Gaddafi’s detention in
Zintan has had Libyan judicial oversight.328
The Chamber also stated that Libya is unable to obtain testimony from
witnesses, two in particular, because Libya does not have full control of some
of the prisons in its territory.329 The Chamber is unclear in its discussion as to
why the testimony of these two particular witnesses is enough to render the
Libyan judicial system unavailable, especially in light of the fact that the
Chamber acknowledges that Libya has obtained statements from other
witnesses in regards to Gaddafi’s alleged crimes.330 Moreover, the Chamber
asserted that the Libyan judicial system is unavailable because the evidence
provided by Libya is unclear on the methods and means by which it can protect
witnesses who may testify in the trial against Gaddafi.331 However, the
Chamber does not discuss why this is a particular concern when the trial is not
yet imminent and the Chamber has acknowledged Libya’s progress and plans
to increase the security for trial participants.332 This is particularly important
because the Chamber should consider the facts as they exist at the time of the
admissibility challenge.333
325

See supra notes 252–60 and accompanying text.
See Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, paras. 204–15.
327 Id. paras. 205–06.
328 Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 19–20; see also Libya’s Admissibility
Motion, supra note 9, paras. 42–44.
329 Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, paras. 209–10.
330 Id. paras. 209–10. The Chamber in referring to these two witnesses cites Annex C to Libya’s
Admissibility Challenge. Id. para. 210 n.346. The author of this Comment could not find a publicly available
copy of this annex, suggesting that the annex has not been released for confidentiality reasons.
331 Id. para. 211.
332 Id. paras. 204, 208, 211.
333 Katanga Appeal, supra note 200, para. 56.
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Finally, the Chamber tried to assert that Libya’s judicial system is
unavailable because Gaddafi has not yet been appointed defense counsel.334
However, at the time of this proceeding, Libya was currently in the
investigation phase.335 During this investigation phase, Gaddafi may have
counsel, but only if he requests such counsel.336 As noted above, there have
been conflicting reports as to whether Gaddafi actually wanted defense
counsel.337 This distinction is key because, as discussed above, Article 17(3)
appears to be most concerned about a state that is prevented from effectively
prosecuting someone, not fairly prosecuting someone.338
The fatal flaw in the Chamber’s inability analysis is its unfocused discourse
on why Libya’s national judicial system is unavailable as opposed to
substantially or totally collapsed. Libya has not yet transferred Gaddafi to
Tripoli because of inadequate detention facilities for someone of his
notoriety.339 This situation is most comparable, if anything, to the lack of
judicial infrastructure noted by the OTP as being indicia of a collapsed judicial
system.340 Inadequate control of detention facilities, something that the
Chamber was concerned about for the purposes of obtaining witness testimony,
would also fall under that category. The inability of Libya to find defense
counsel for Gaddafi may be indicia of a collapsed national judicial system
because the failure involves the Government actually seeking counsel for
Gaddafi, but that failure is not causing Libya to be unable to proceed with the
investigation and prosecution of Gaddafi at this time.341 Additionally, there is
nothing to suggest that Libya’s inability to do so is the result of at least a
substantially collapsed system required by Article 17(3).
The unavailability of a national judicial system, on the other hand, has
often been construed to incorporate legislative or legal impediments that render
the system completely or substantially unavailable.342 The Chamber held that
ordinary crimes were sufficient for the purposes of determining whether Libya
334

Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, paras. 212–14.
Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 15; see also Libya Admissibility Motion,
supra note 9, para. 59.
336 Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 20.
337 Id.
338 See Part III.B.2.
339 Admissibility Decision, supra note 10, paras. 190–91; see Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript,
supra note 54, at 19–20.
340 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 242, para. 50.
341 Rather, as discussed above, Libya is not mandated to ensure that Gaddafi has legal counsel until the
trial phase begins. See Admissibility Hearing Day 1 Transcript, supra note 54, at 20.
342 See CASSESE, supra note 252, at 344.
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was investigating the same case that was before the ICC.343 The Chamber also
reviewed the various applicable laws in Libya that make it possible for the
Libyan government to investigate and prosecute Gaddafi for his alleged crimes
during the Libyan Civil War.344 In fact, the Chamber arguably only pointed to
two main deficiencies in the law that might make the judicial system
“unavailable.” The first deficiency is the possible lack of protective measures
designed to protect witnesses who may give testimony at trial.345 However,
there is not a total lack of witness protection measures; rather, Libya indicated
that some protective measures are within the discretion of the trial judge.346
Thus, the Chamber’s concern was not knowing the exact scope and nature of
all protective measures available in Libya. Even then, there is no discussion as
to why this particular concern renders the judicial system unavailable at a time
when the case against Gaddafi is still in the investigatory stage. Second, the
Chamber was concerned with the fact that in abstentia trials are not permitted
when the accused is in Libyan territory and his location is known.347 However,
Libya was in the process of securing the transfer of Gaddafi from Zintan to
Tripoli,348 which is not comparable to a situation where the state lacks
sufficient procedural legislation or laws granting amnesties and immunities.
2. The Chamber’s Inability Discussion Is Obiter Dictum
The Chamber’s discussion of Libya’s inability to investigate or prosecute
Gaddafi is also undermined by the fact that it is obiter dictum. As discussed
above, the ICC considers an admissibility challenge to involve a two-part
inquiry.349 In this case, the Chamber should not have even reached a discussion
about Libya’s ability or lack thereof to investigate or prosecute Gaddafi. As
discussed above, the Chamber found that Libya was not investigating the same
case as the ICC.350 The Chamber made this decision because, while some of
the evidence obtained by Libya in its investigation of Gaddafi contained
information related to Gaddafi’s use of the Security Forces to kill civilians, the
Chamber did not believe that the evidence as a whole sufficiently demonstrated

343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
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the scope of the Libyan investigation.351 Consequently, the Chamber never
really went further than the first step of the analysis when it decided that
Gaddafi’s case was admissible to the ICC. The Chamber tried to make its
discussion of Libya’s ability irrelevant by relating it to the Chamber’s issuance
of a decision on the admissibility challenge.352 However, this reason is
tangential to the Chamber’s primary reason for issuing the decision, namely
that it believed Libya “had sufficient opportunities to submit evidence in
support of its Admissibility Challenge.”353 Thus, the Chamber’s discussion on
Libya’s ability, or lack thereof, is wholly unnecessary to the disposition of the
challenge.
B. How the Chamber Should Have Decided the Admissibility Challenge
In the final analysis, if it was necessary for the Chamber to discuss the
issue, it should have found that Libya is genuinely able to investigate and
prosecute Gaddafi. Although it may be questionable whether the Libyan
government actually has effective control over Gaddafi in Zintan (unable to
obtain the accused),354 Libya may not be able to try Gaddafi in abstentia or
appoint counsel for Gaddafi (unable to otherwise proceed),355 and Libyan
officials may not be able to investigate Gaddafi’s crime in some areas (unable
to obtain evidence),356 this is not enough to prove inability. All of these things
must be due to a total or substantial collapse or the unavailability of the
judicial system.357 What constitutes a substantial collapse or unavailability of
the judicial system? The change of the language from “partial collapse” to
“substantial collapse” during the drafting of the Rome Statute358 suggests that
there must be more than mere conflict or insurgency in a state for a judicial
system to be considered “substantially collapsed.”359 Rather, the conflict in the
area or the general degradation of the state must be to the point that the state
cannot shift resources or transfer venues to carry out the investigation or
prosecution.360 The factors listed in the Informal Expert Paper can help
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determine whether a state has the ability to shift resources or transfer
venues.361
In consideration of these factors, it appears, at the time of this writing, that
Libya is neither suffering from a substantial collapse of its judicial system nor
is the Libyan judicial system unavailable to Gaddafi. First, there is evidence
that Libya has tried to maintain a sufficient number of prosecuting authorities
and judges to sustain its judicial system “by reopening courts and recalling
judges,” and in transferring “detainees to central government control.”362 Libya
has also started criminal proceedings against as many as forty-one persons
accused of committing crimes during the Libyan Civil War.363 Moreover, it is
perhaps possible to demonstrate that Libya has the resources to continue
building its national judicial system by securing al-Senussi’s transfer to
Libya.364 Libya also has the requisite “substantive or procedural penal
legislation”365 to effectuate criminal investigations and proceedings.366 There
are also instances of Libya’s judiciary not only working, but working
independently, by declaring a law passed by the NTC as unconstitutional367
and even declaring the criminal procedures of the People’s Court
unconstitutional.368
Additionally, there are significant key differences between the situation in
Libya and the Bemba case. First, the discussion in the Bemba case was obiter
dictum, having decided the case on the ground that there was not a “decision
not to prosecute” under Article 17(1)(b).369 Second, even though both regions
are afflicted with security concerns, Libya has initiated a program to help
disarm illegal militias and, according to counsel for Libya at the admissibility
hearings, this program is having some degree of success.370 Most importantly,
however, the Cour de Cassation initially determined that the CAR was unable
to prosecute Bemba.371 The situation in Libya, on the other hand, was referred
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to the ICC by the Security Council372 and Libya has since challenged
admissibility.373 Thus, the Bemba case does not require a finding of Libya’s
inability to prosecute Gaddafi.
To say, however, that Libya is currently genuinely able to investigate and
prosecute Gaddafi is not to say Libya will always be genuinely able to
investigate and prosecute him. For instance, the OPCD argued at the
admissibility hearing that Libya may be genuinely unable to prosecute Gaddafi
because both the Libyan Constitutional Declaration and Criminal Procedure
Code exclude intercept evidence, unless such evidence was first gathered upon
authorization by a judge.374 The argument is that “the Libyan [prosecutors]
would be unable to genuinely bring Mr. Gaddafi to justice if they were to base
their case on inadmissible evidence.”375 However, this argument depends upon
the evidence being declared inadmissible. Libya clarified during the
admissibility hearing that the intercept evidence it possessed was from
telephone conversations recorded, upon orders from Muammar Gaddafi, by the
two major telephone companies in Libya.376 In the aftermath of Tripoli’s
liberation, these public documents and recordings were made widely available
to the public.377 Thus, according to Libya, these facts and other events
surrounding the Libyan Civil War raise practical and legal considerations that
mean that such intercept evidence will not necessarily be ruled inadmissible.378
This situation demonstrates the importance of Article 19(10), which allows the
Prosecutor to request a review of inadmissibility from the same Pre-Trial
Chamber that made the original holding. This Article allows the Court to
reconsider a case’s admissibility when the ability or inability of a state is more
certain than speculative. Thus, the OTP could have used its authority to request
review under Article 19(10) if it became apparent that the intercept evidence
would not be admissible under Libyan law because of the origin of the
evidence, because Libya could not sufficiently authenticate the intercepts, or
because of some other legal hindrance.
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CONCLUSION
Over the course of this discussion, a few observations can be made. First,
the drafters of the Rome Statute were particularly concerned with the issue of
state sovereignty, which is why they implemented a complementary
jurisdictional scheme to the ICC rather than a primary jurisdictional scheme
like the ones found in the ICTR and the ICTY.379 The drafters also intended
that the inability exception found in Article 17(1)(a) only be applied in a
limited set of circumstances, which is why Article 17(3)’s language was
changed from a partial to a substantial collapse or unavailability of the national
judicial system. This change necessitates the conclusion that the Statute allows
for a national judicial system to suffer a partial collapse or be unavailable, and
yet still be able to hold investigations and prosecutions in good faith. The
collapse or unavailability in question should be due to something more than
just armed conflict, especially if resources are available to dedicate to the
proceedings. It is submitted here that the threshold question of whether a state
is unable to adjust resources or transfer venue in order to carry out the
investigation or prosecution must first be reached before the ICC can find that
a state’s judicial system has substantially collapsed. With regards to a judicial
system’s unavailability, there ought to be legal impediments that prevent the
state from carrying the investigation or prosecution forward, such as statutes of
limitations on crimes, amnesty laws, or as the OTP suggests, a lack of
substantive or procedural legislation that render the state fully incapable of
continuing the investigation or prosecution.380
This case provided a glimpse into how the ICC may view complementarity
in the future. For the purposes of recognizing the importance that the drafters
of the Statute placed on state sovereignty, and the limited circumstances that
the drafters seemed to indicate as their intent with the strict language used in
Article 17(3), the Chamber should have held that Libya is genuinely able to
investigate and prosecute Gaddafi and work with the Libyan government in an
effort to help it build its criminal justice system for future prosecutions. By
finding the case inadmissible, the ICC could have taken a more positive
approach to the situation in Libya, providing assistance to Libya to aid it in
prosecuting international crimes, and only intervening if it became absolutely
apparent that Libya could not genuinely prosecute Gaddafi.381 Instead, it
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appears after this decision that the Court is taking a hard-lined approach
toward complementarity, an approach more akin to the concurrent jurisdiction
that was granted to the ICTR and ICTY,382 rather than the complementary
jurisdiction that the Rome Statute drafters intended. Moreover, the Chamber,
through its muddied analysis of the inability issue, has tried to use
“unavailability” as a means of bypassing the clear intent of the drafters of the
Rome Statute to allow the ICC to take a case away from an actively
investigating state only in a limited set of circumstances.
M. CHRISTOPHER PITTS∗
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